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We analyze a macroeconomic model of monopolistic competition in which consumers
earn unequal incomes. When preferences are non-homothetic, the distribution of income
a!ects equilibrium mark-ups and equilibrium product diversity.
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In this paper we analyze the role of the personal distribution of income for macroeconomic
outcomes when !rms have market power. While the recent macroeconomic literature has
extensively studied the role of income inequality when ca#ital mar)ets are imperfect (see e.g.
Bertola, 1999, for a recent survey) this literature has been almost entirely silent about the role
of income distribution when there are imperfections in #roduct mar)ets.1
This question, however, is both theoretically interesting and empirically relevant. In the
theoretical literature, any impact of inequality transmitted by product market power is typi-
cally ruled out by the assumption of homothetic preferences and/or a representative consumer.
From an empirical point of view, numerous studies have shown that homothetic preferences are
a hopelessly unrealistic description of actual consumer behavior (see e.g. Deaton and Muell-
bauer, 1980). Hence exploring the implicatons of non-homothetic preferences sheds light on a
neglected, but empirically relevant issue.
Our starting point is a variant of the popular model of Dixit and Stiglitz (1977) that has
been widely applied to macroeconomic questions. We keep their assumption of symmetric
preferences and technologies but allow for utility functions that are non-homothetic.2 Keeping
the symmetry assumption highlights the role of consumer heterogeneity. Deviating from the
homotheticity assumption makes the !rms’ market demand functions dependent on the distri-
bution of income and allows us to study the role of income inequality for equilibrium product
diversity and mark-ups.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the set-up of the model and derives
individual and market demand functions. In Section 3 we discuss existence and uniqueness of
the general equilibrium and how this equilibrium is a!ected by changes in the distribution of
resources across consumers.
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2echn0l06.7 8re9erence#7 and end0/:en$# Consider an economy with a continuum of
products indexed by !. All goods are produced with the same technology that requires a !xed
set-up of a units of labor to run a !rm and one unit of labor to produce one unit of output.
The labor market is competitive and the wage rate equals $. Hence the marginal cost of
production are also equal to $, the same for all goods.
All consumers have the same preferences. Their objective function is de!ned over an
in!nite, continuous range of potentially producable products ! ! [0,"] . From this set of
di!erentiated goods an endogenous range N is produced in equilibrium. We assume symmetry
and se#arability of the various products. Moreover, we denote by v(c(!)) the utility gained
from consuming good ! in quantity c(!) and normalize the utility from not consuming a good
to zero, v(0) = 0. Then consumer’s objective function can be written as
u({c(!)}) =
! !
0
v(c(!))d!.
The function v(·) satis!es the usual assumptions v" + 0 and v"" , 0. Furthermore we assume
v"(c)c-v(c) , 1 for all c # 0.$
There is a population of consumers of mass 1. Consumers are heterogenous with respect
to their labor endowment !. The endowment distribution has support over the interval
£
!, !¯
¤
,
0 , ! , !¯ ,", and cumulative density . (!). Average endowment is normalized to unity.
;ndi=id>al c0n#>:8$i0n and :arke$ de:and The optimal consumption of good ! is
given by the !rst order condition
v"(c(!)) = "(!)p(!), (1)
where "(!) is the marginal utility of income for a consumer with endowment !. Equation
(1) implicitly de!nes the optimal demand for product ! as a function of its price and the
endowment level !. For further use we denote the individual demand function by c(p(!), !). By
implicit di!erentiation of equation (1) it is straightforward to verify that the price elasticity of
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indi2idual demand, which we denote by #(·), is given by
#(c(p(!), !)) $ %$c(p(!), !)
$p(!)
p(!)
c(p(!), !)
= % v
"(c(p(!), !))
c(p(!), !) · v""(c(p(!), !)) . (2)
Thus #(·) is determined by the curvature of the utility function v(·) and, in general, varies with
consumption level c.
Market demand, which we denote by 0, can be calculated by horizontal aggregation of
individual demand curves. From equation (1), market demand for good ! is
0(p(!)) $
! %!
!
c(p(!), !)d. (!). (3)
By symmetry, the above demand function depends on ! only via the price p(!), but is otherwise
independent of !.
3 45(*6*b%*(8 2%o'()$ '*9.%:*$; <n' 8<%=0(2:
)@>ili"ri>: c0ndi$i0n# The equilibrium is characterized by symmetry.4 Therefore we have
p(!) = p, c(p(!), !) = c(p, !), and 0(p(!)) = 0(p).
Producers have monopoly power on their respective markets and set prizes to maximize
pro!ts. A single !rm is small and cannot in"uence aggregate variables. Formally, each monop-
olist solves the problem max" [p 0(p)%$ 0(p)] . The solution to this problem can be written
in the familiar form
p% $
p
=
1
%(p)
, with %(p) =
! %!
!
c(p, !)
0(p)
#(c(p, !))d. (!). (4)
where %(p) denotes the price elasticity of mar)et demand. Equation (4) states that pro!ts are
maximized where the relation between the pro!t margin (price minus marginal cost) and the
price, the ”Lerner index” is equal to the inverse of the price elasticity of demand. This price
elasticity is a weighted sum of the indi2idual price elasticities, the weights being individuals’
relative consumption levels c'"$!(%'"( .
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There is free entry for !rms. In equilibrium, the marginal !rm just breaks even and, by
symmetry, all other !rms also make zero pro!ts. In equilibrium we must have
(p% $)0 = $a, (5)
where a is the !xed labor input necessary to operate a !rm, and 0 = 0(p) denotes market
demand when !rms charge the monopoly price.
The economy-wide resource constraint requires that labor demand cannot exceed labor
supply which is equal to unity (a population of mass 1 that supplies on average 1 unit of
labor). Aggregate labor demand in the production of !nal output equals 0N (N is the mass
of !rms that breaks even) and aggregate labor demand necessary to cover the !xed cost is aN.
A perfect labor market ensures that in equilibrium labor supply equals labor demand
1 = (0+ a)N. (6)
In equilibrium, the distribution of income is identical to the endowment distribution. Firms
make zero pro!ts, all income accrues from labor, and each household gets the same wage per
labor unit. Consumers spend all income and spread expenditures equally across goods. Hence
a consumer with labor endowment ! purchases exactly !0 units on each variety
c(!, p) = !0. (7)
Ani@>ene## =er#># :>l$i8lici$. 09 e@>ili"ria The above system of four equations can
easily be reduced to a single equation with the degree of product diversity N as the unknown.
Using equations (5) and (6) we can write (p% $) -p = aN. The right-hand-side of (4) can be
rewritten using (7) and (6). Taken together this yields
aN =
$! %!
!
! #
µ
!
1% aN
N
¶
d. (!)
'"1
where N ! (0, 1-a) . (8)
The left-hand-side relates feasible values of product diversity N to values of the Lerner index
(p% $) -p that ensure zero pro!ts (ZP-curve in Figure 1). The right-hand-side relates values
of N to values of (p% $) -p that guarantee pro!t maximization (PM-curve in Figure 1).
Pr080#i$i0n C a4 There e7ists at least one equilibrium with N ! (0, 1-a). b4 :hen the #rice
elasticity of indi2idual demands #(c) = %v"(c)-(cv""(c)) is non;increasin< in c= this equilibrium
is unique> :hen #(c) is non;monotonic in c there may ?but need not4 be multi#le equilibria>
5
Pr009. a) We argue graphically (Figure 1). Both PM- and ZP-curve are continuous.
The ZP-curve starts at the origin, slopes upward and stops at (p% $) -p = 1 when N =
1-a. The PM-curve starts at (p%$) -p = 1-%(") when N = 0, and stops at (p% $) -p =
1-%(0) when N = 1-a. At least one intersection exists when %(") , " and %(0) + 1. To
see that this is actually the case recall that 0 , v"(c)c-v(c) , 1. Using l’Hoˆpital’s rule we
may write 0 , limc#0 v"(c)c-v(c) = limc#0 [v""(c)c+ v"(c)] -v"(c) = limc#0 [1 + v""(c)c-v"(c)] =
limc#0 [1% 1-#(c)] , 1 from which it follows that 1 , #(0) , ". When for all consumers
c = 0, we have %(0) = #(0) + 1. By similar arguments, we have 1 , #(") , ". When for all
consumers c&", we have %(") = #(") ,".
b) If #(c) = %v"(c)-(cv""(c)) decreases in c, it increases in N . Then the market price
elasticity %(0) =
( %!
! ! #
¡
! 1"a!!
¢
d. (!) also increases in N. Thus the PM-curve is downward
sloping and we have a unique equilibrium (Figure 1a). If %v"(c)-(cv""(c)) increases in c, the
PM-curve is upward sloping. Then, the equilibrium is either unique (P2A) or there may be
multiple equilibria (P2() (Figure 1b).
Figure 1a,b
The proposition says that the equilibrium is unique if a larger number of !rms is associated
with lower mark-ups (PM-curve is downward sloping). One might consider such a situation as
”realistic” as it is consistent with the intuition that an increase in the number of competitors
tends to cut pro!ts margins. However, the proposition also says that there are utility functions
where a larger number of competitors is associated with higher pro!t-margins. This is a
necessary (but not su"cient) condition for multiple equilibria. The intuition for multiplicity is
this: When many !rms enter, production per good is low, elasticities of substitution are small
and mark-ups are high, which supports an equilibrium with high entry. When few !rms enter,
elasticities of substitution are high and mark-ups are low. This in turn supports an equilibrium
with a low number of !rms.
2he i:8ac$ 09 ine@>ali$. 0n 8r0d>c$ di=er#i$. and :arkE>8# We now turn to our
question of primary interest: How does inequality a!ect product diversity and mark-ups? The
following proposition follows directly from our previous analysis.
Pr080#i$i0n F @onsider a unique equilibrium> :hen %v"(c)-v""(c) is conca2e ?con2e74 in c=
a more unequal distribution of ! increases ?decreases4 #roduct di2ersity and the mar);u#= and
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decreases ?increases4 the real wa<e> Anly when v"(c)-v""(c) is a!ne;linear in c, macroeconomic
a<<re<ates are una"ected by the endowment distribution>
Pr009. Consider two distributions .0(!) and .1(!), such that .0(!) is less unequal than
.1(!) (that is, .0(!) second order stochastically dominates (SSD) .1(!)). Using equation (2)
we rewrite !#(!0) = %v"(!0)-(0 v""(!0)). When %v"(c)-v""(c) is concave (convex), SSD implies( %!
! %v"(!0)-v""(!0)d.1(!) , (+)
( %!
! %v"(!0)-v""(!0)d.0(!). Concavity implies, for given 0 (and,
by equation (6), for a given N), more inequality decreases the price elasticity of market demand
and increases the Lerner index. In Figure 1a, the PM-curve shifts up. In the new equilibrium,
both product diversity and the Lerner index are higher.
To understand the intuition, consider the e!ect of inequality on the shape of market de-
mand functions. An indi2idual ’s demand reaction to a price change is given by $c(!)-$p =
(1-p) [%v"(!0)-v""(!0)] (use equation (1)). The sensitivity of mar)et demand to a price change
is just the sum of these individual demand changes. When %v"(!0)-v""(!0) is conca2e, an in-
crease in inequality decreases the price sensitivity of market demand. Hence the price elasticity
of the new market demand function is smaller. As a consequence, both equilibrium product
diversity and the Lerner index increase.5
Obviously, when %v"(!0)-v""(!0) is convex, analogous arguments lead to the conclusion
that a mean preserving spread in the endowment distribution makes demand more sensitive to
changes in prices. The price elasticity of the new market demand function is now larger. Thus,
in the new equilibrium, mark-ups and product diversity are smaller, and the real wage is higher.
Only in the special case, when the utility function v(·) is such that %v"(c)-v""(c) is a"ne-linear
in c, changes in the endowment distribution have no e!ect on aggregate outcomes. Only in
that case, macroeconomic outcomes can be viewed as if they were generated by decisions of a
representative consumer.*
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